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ABSTRACT: What is philosophy as a way of life? Is it a distinctive approach to 
philosophy? Is it closely aligned with continental philosophy? Does it offer a third 
way, distinct from both analytic and continental philosophy? Is all philosophy 
potentially life-changing? Do we lose something important if we conceive 
philosophy as a practical therapeutic exercise? I shall attempt to address all these 
questions, drawing on Lucretius for my final response.  
 
I. Introducing Philosophy as a Way of Life  
 
In recent years there has been a gradual development of interest in the idea that 
philosophy might be conceived as a guide to life. The phrase ‘Philosophy as a 
Way of Life’ is closely associated with the French philosopher and scholar of 
ancient philosophy Pierre Hadot, whose work gained prominence in the 
English-speaking world in 1995 with the publication of a book called Philosophy 
as a Way of Life.1 In the chapter from which the volume gets its title Hadot 
claims that in antiquity “philosophy was a way of life,” a “mode of existing-in-
the-world, which had to be practiced at each instant, and the goal of which was 
to transform the whole of the individual’s life.”2 Philosophy was conceived as a 
																																																								
1 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995), based upon, although not straightforwardly translating, Hadot’s Exercices 
spirituels et philosophie antique (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1981; 2nd edn 1987; new edn Albin 
Michel, 2002).  
2 Ibid. 265. The essay, “La philosophie comme manière de vivre,” was first published in the 
Annuaire du Collège de France (1984-85), 477-87, and reprinted in the second edition of Exercices 
spirituels et philosophie antique.  
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love of wisdom, and wisdom, Hadot says, “does not merely cause us to know: it 
makes us ‘be’ in a different way.”3  
 
Hadot goes on to illustrate the ways in which a wide range of ancient 
philosophers presented the task of philosophy as something therapeutic, 
something aimed at overcoming mental disturbances so that the practioner can 
attain some kind of inner tranquillity. Hadot contrasts this with philosophy as it 
is usually practised today: “Ancient philosophy proposed to mankind an art of 
living. By contrast, modern philosophy appears above all as the construction of 
a technical jargon reserved for specialists.”4 Having said that, Hadot also refers 
to a number of post-antique philosophers whom he thinks still hold on to this 
ancient conception of philosophy. He suggests that both Descartes and Spinoza 
held on to this way of thinking about philosophy, as did Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche, and Hadot thinks that it is no coincidence that none of these thinkers 
held university positions.5 The important point in the present context is that 
this is not only how philosophy was once conceived long ago, but also a live 
metaphilosophical option that has been taken up by philosophers throughout 
the history of philosophy and can still be taken up today.  
 
Can we flesh this notion out further? I take it to involve the following things: 
first, that the ultimate motivation of philosophy is to transform one’s way of life; 
second, that there ought to be some connection and consistency between 
someone’s stated philosophical ideas and their behaviour; and third that actions 
are ultimately more philosophically significant than words. It is often conceived 																																																								
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid. 272.  
5 Ibid. 271-2.  
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as something therapeutic, but it need not be. It usually aims at a good life, but 
again this may not be necessarily so. It is transformative, though perhaps one 
ought not to assume that this will always be for the better. It resonates with 
what Isaiah Berlin called “the power of ideas,” that is, the ability of philosophy to 
transform the life of an individual, or even an entire society.6 As he put it, the 
concepts and categories with which people think “must deeply affect their 
lives.”7 One of the best definitions of Philosophy as a Way of Life, however, can 
be found in Friedrich Nietzsche’s Schopenhauer as Educator:  
 
I attach importance to a philosopher only to the extent that he is 
capable of setting an example. … The philosopher must supply this 
example in his visible life, and not merely in his books; that is, it 
must be presented in the way the philosophers of Greece taught, 
through facial expressions, demeanor, clothing, food, and custom 
more than through what they said, let alone what they wrote.8  
 
Or, as he put it a little later on in the same work, “the only possible criticism of 
any philosophy, and the only one that proves anything, is trying to see if one can 
live by this philosophy.”9 Or again, from his notebooks, “the product of the 
philosopher is his life (first, before his works). That is his work of art.”10 This 																																																								
6 See Isaiah Berlin, “The Purpose of Philosophy,” in his Concepts and Categories (London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1978), 1-11.  
7 Ibid. 10.  
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, Schopenhauer als Erzieher § 3 (Kritische Studienausgabe [hereafter KSA], 
ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: De Gruyter / Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch, 
1999), 1: 350,23-31; The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche 2: Unfashionable Observations, trans. 
Richard T. Gray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 183-84).  
9 Ibid. § 8 (KSA 1: 417,26-8; Complete Works 2, 246).  
10 Nietzsche, Nachlass 29[205] (KSA 7: 712).  
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Nietzschean image was taken up by Michel Foucault when he wrote, “couldn’t 
everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an 
art object, but not our life?”11 It is this way of thinking about philosophy that we 
find articulated by Hadot, Nietzsche, and Foucault, that I want to examine 
further in what follows.  
 
II. Two Competing Images of Philosophy: Scientific versus Humanistic  
 
I want to begin by drawing a distinction between what appear to be two quite 
different ways of thinking about philosophy. I shall call these ‘the scientific 
conception of philosophy’ and ‘the humanistic conception of philosophy’. 
Neither of those labels is ideal, but I hope they will do for present purposes. I 
think the contrast can be seen clearly if we compare the metaphilosophy of 
Socrates and Aristotle.12 In drawing a distinction between them, I differ from 
Hadot, who, as we shall see, tried to present both Socrates and Aristotle as 
adherents of Philosophy as a Way of Life.  
 
First, Socrates.13 In the Apology, Plato has Socrates say that his principal concern 
is a desire live a philosophical life. This is implicit throughout the text but there 
are a few passages that stand out. The first of these is when Socrates tries to 
describe his philosophical mission. He presents it as a duty to live as a 																																																								
11 Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” in The 
Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 1991), 340-72, at 350.  
12 On the claim that Socrates and Aristotle differ in their conceptions of philosophy see John 
Sellars, The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2003), 33-6, and, more recently, John M. Cooper, Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient 
Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 70.  
13 I have discussed Socrates’ conception of philosophy at greater length in John Sellars, ‘Plato’s 
Apology of Socrates, A Metaphilosophical Text’, Philosophy and Literature 38 (2014), 433-45. 
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philosopher, examining himself and others.14 Later, in response to his accusers 
who have condemned him to death, he says, “you have brought about my death 
in the belief that through it you will be delivered from submitting the conduct of 
your lives to criticism.”15 This idea that the task at hand is to examine lives is 
repeated in another passage where he says that the best thing anyone can do is 
to examine themselves and others, adding – famously – that a life without this 
sort of examination is not worth living.16 For Socrates, then, philosophy is an 
activity directed at trying to figure out how to live well, subjecting our current 
way of life to examination. This of course leads to a desire to know various things 
and attempts to define various things, not least what is and is not good, but the 
motivation, even if it remains implicit, is clear: Socrates wants to find out how to 
live well – and not just for the sake of knowing how to live well, but because 
above all else he actually wants to live well, to enjoy a good life, whatever that 
might turn out to be. This remains the motivation throughout the early Socratic 
dialogues. In the Gorgias, for instance, Socrates insists on the seriousness of 
their discussion by reminding his interlocutors that it is about “what course of 
life is best.”17  
 
If we turn to Aristotle – or at least the Aristotle of the Metaphysics – we find a 
quite different image of philosophy. He presents the task of the philosopher as 
one of uncovering principles and causes. He defines wisdom as knowing the 																																																								
14 Plato, Apology 28e (philosophounta me dein zên).  
15 Ibid. 39c (elenchon tou biou).  
16 Ibid. 38a (ho de anexetastos bios ou biôtos anthrôpôi).  
17 Plato, Gorgias 500c (hontina chrê tropon zên). One might argue that this concern with the best 
form of life, even when practically motivated, is directed towards the lives of other people rather 
than the life of Socrates himself. This is certainly possible. But as we saw earlier in the Apology, 
there Socrates says that he wants to examine the lives of both himself and others.  
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causes of things.18 He then defines philosophy as “knowledge of the truth,” 
adding that the “end of theoretical knowledge is truth, and not action.”19 He 
acknowledges that there is also practical knowledge that is concerned with 
action, but here he identifies philosophy with theoretical knowledge and 
prioritizes theoretical knowledge over practical knowledge because it deals with 
things that are unchanging.20 The paradigmatic example of a philosopher that 
Aristotle has in mind here is not Socrates but instead Thales – the man who fell 
down a well because he was so engrossed in studying the stars that he failed to 
look where he was going, and also the man who could have made a fortune 
speculating on grain harvests using his ability to predict heavenly movements 
but chose not to21 – in short, a man far more concerned with trying to 
understand how the physical world works than he was in learning how to live 
well within it. It is true that at a number of points in the Metaphysics Aristotle 
says that philosophy is a wide-ranging subject that embraces theoretical, 
practical, and productive questions; however, he also insists that the “first 
philosophy” that he is examining there is the most important part of philosophy 
because it deals with what is unchanging, namely the first principles that 
underpin Nature.22 For Aristotle, then, the motivation is not to learn how to live 
well but rather to understand the way the world works.  
																																																								
18 See Aristotle, Metaph. 1.1, 981a30-b6; note also 982a1-3. 
19 See Metaph. 2.1, 993b19-21: orthôs d’ echei kai to kaleisthai tên philosophian epistêmên tês 
alêtheias. theôrêtikês men gar telos alêtheia praktikês d’ ergon.  
20 See ibid. 993b21-3. 
21 See Plato, Theaetetus 174a (DK 11A9) and Aristotle, Pol. 1259a5-18 (DK 11A10) respectively.  
22 Aristotle’s division of knowledge into the practical, productive, and theoretical at Metaph. 
1025b25 does not appear to prioritize one form of knowledge over any other. However, under the 
heading of “theoretical knowledge” (theôrêtikê) falls first philosophy or theology, which is 
accorded a priority over all other branches of enquiry because it deals with that which is 
unchanging. Knowledge of this sort forms the paradigm for Aristotle’s conception of philosophy: 
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There seems to be a clear metaphilosophical contrast, then, between these two 
images of philosophy. Socrates and Aristotle are doing two quite different 
things, it seems. Hadot did his best to subsume Aristotle under the banner of 
Philosophy as a Way of Life by reminding us that the Aristotelian ideal of theôria 
is an activity that itself becomes a lived practice and so something that 
effectively becomes a way of life.23 However Hadot does not deny that for 
Aristotle the highest form of theoretical knowledge is something that is chosen 
for itself.24 It is true that the pursuit of theoretical knowledge might itself form a 
way of life, indeed the best way of life to which a human might aspire. However, 
the claim that this form of life is the motivating force for Aristotle seems less 
convincing. What matters to Aristotle most of all is understanding the way the 
world works; given that, naturally he will prefer a life devoted to the pursuit of 
that kind of understanding over a life devoted to the pursuit of anything else. 
That does not mean, though, that the question of how best to live was 
uppermost in his mind, in the way that it clearly was for Socrates.  
 
One might think that if we want to understand what Aristotle thought about the 
best way to live we ought to be looking at the Nicomachean Ethics rather than 																																																																																																																																													
he says further on that the theoretical sciences are superior to the other sciences, and that “first 
philosophy” (prôtê philosophia) is superior to the other theoretical sciences (Metaph. 1026a22-3).  
23 See Pierre Hadot, Études de philosophie ancienne (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1998), 225. Note also 
Pol. 1325b16-21, cited by Hadot, where Aristotle presents contemplation as a practice, but also 
(significantly) describes it as an end in itself. Matthew Kapstein, in his book Reason’s Traces: 
Identity and Interpretation in Indian & Tibetan Buddhist Thought (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 
2001), 9, notes the “apparently diminished place of Aristotle” in Hadot’s account of ancient 
philosophy but also suggests that, for Hadot, Aristotle’s theôria is very much a lived practice. I 
thank my anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention.   
24 See e.g. Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002), 77, a translation of Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique? (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1995).  
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the Metaphysics. In the opening book of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle 
famously says that all human beings identify eudaimonia with living well.25 
However, later on when he prioritizes the ideal of the contemplative life over 
other forms of life he does so not based on its propensity to generate 
eudaimonia but rather on the superiority of its objects of knowledge, namely 
unchanging universals rather than changeable particulars.26 The contemplative 
life is best not because it is identified with living well but because it devotes 
itself to the highest form of knowledge there is.  
 
It seems, then, that we have a clear metaphilosophical division between 
Socrates and Aristotle. Both are committed to the pursuit of knowledge and 
both offer an image of an ideal life involving the pursuit of knowledge, but 
nevertheless there is a clear difference when we turn to their ultimate 
motivations. Socrates pursues knowledge in order to live a philosophical life, 
while Aristotle lives a philosophical life in order to pursue knowledge. This is a 
subtle but, I think, important difference. It is also the difference between what I 
earlier called the scientific and humanistic conceptions of philosophy. 
Aristotle’s scientific image of philosophy is a disinterested pursuit of knowledge 
for its own sake; Socrates’ humanistic image of philosophy is concerned with 
what it means to be human and how to live a good human life. The subsequent 
history of Western philosophy has seen both of these conceptions of philosophy 																																																								
25 See Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1.4, 1095a17-22.  
26 In Eth. Nic. 6 Aristotle says there are different types of reasoning and that excellence in 
intellectual reasoning is to be preferred over excellence in practical reasoning, in part because it 
deals with unchanging universals rather than changeable particulars. That kind of knowledge is 
thought to be more valuable because of its wider applicability. This is effectively the argument 
behind the claim made later in Eth. Nic. 10 for the priority of sophia over phronêsis. However, as 
Matthew Sharpe has reminded me, in Eth. Nic. 10 (esp. 1177a22-5) Aristotle does say that one 
reason to prioritize a life devoted to contemplation is that it is the pleasantest of virtuous 
activities.  
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flourish at different times, sometimes in combination, and sometimes apart. We 
see the contrast very clearly in the Renaissance, for example, when Petrarch 
attacks the scholastic Aristotelians of his day because, unlike Socrates and 
Cicero, he thinks that they teach him nothing about how to live.27  
 
Although I have not said it explicitly yet, it should be clear that I am 
provisionally identifying this Socratic, humanistic conception of philosophy 
with Philosophy as a Way of Life. By extension I am contrasting it with the 
Aristotelian, scientific conception of philosophy. Yet, as we shall see, such a 
distinction may turn out to be too simplistic.  
 
III. Philosophy as a Way of Life and Continental Philosophy  
 
When faced with a contrast between a practical, engaged, existential image of 
philosophy on the one hand and a disinterested scientific one on the other, it is 
tempting to try to map this division onto the distinction between ‘continental’ 
and ‘analytic’ philosophy.28 Whether we think of the contrast between 
continental Existentialism and Oxford linguistic philosophy in the 1950s and 60s 
or engaged Marxism and Quinean naturalism a little later on, it seems not 
unreasonable to suggest that continental philosophers are the heirs of Socrates 
while analytic philosophers are heirs to Aristotle. Indeed, some commentators 
on the so-called analytic-continental divide have presented the difference 																																																								
27 See Petrarch, De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia §§ 107-8 (text and translation in Francesco 
Petrarca, Invectives, ed and trans. David Marsh (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 
314-15). 
28 I hesitate before using either of these labels. As Simon Glendenning (The Idea of Continental 
Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006)) and Hans-Johann Glock (What is 
Analytic Philosophy? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)) have shown, neither term 
refers to a unified, coherent tradition.  
	 10 
between the two traditions in terms of their motivation: while analytic 
philosophers pursue knowledge (epistêmê), continental philosophers aspire to 
wisdom (phronêsis).29   
 
There are certainly many examples of what I am calling Philosophy as a Way of 
Life among philosophers that usually get labelled ‘continental’. We might think 
of Nietzsche’s remarks in Schopenhauer as Educator that we saw earlier or the 
later work of Michel Foucault on care of the self. Hadot was an important 
influence on Foucault’s later interests in ancient philosophy and in his own 
work Hadot aligns a range of European thinkers with Philosophy as a Way of 
Life, including Goethe, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty.30 
Of course for Hadot, writing in Paris, none of these were ‘continental’ 
philosophers; they were just modern exponents of an ancient way of 
approaching philosophy.  
 
IV. Philosophy as a Way of Life as a Third Way  
 
Although there have been many continental philosophers who appear to 
embrace something akin to Philosophy as a Way of Life, there are no doubt 
others who do not. Of course it is difficult to make generalizations here given 
that the label ‘continental philosophy’ does not really refer to anything at all 
beyond those bits of recent Western philosophy that analytic philosophers tend 
to reject as not how they think philosophy ought to be done.31 But even so, there 																																																								
29 See e.g. Simon Critchley, Continental Philosophy, A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 1-11, who also acknowledges the limitations of putting it in these terms.  
30 See Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, passim.  
31 See Glendenning, The Idea of Continental Philosophy, esp. 12-13.  
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are many philosophers in the ‘continental tradition’ who seem to be engaged in 
something akin to Philosophy as a Way of Life, which should come as no 
surprise given that, as I have tried to show, the idea is expressed in texts that are 
foundational for the subject as a whole, namely Plato’s Apology and the early 
Socratic dialogues.  
 
Even so, some have rejected the idea of any connection between the two. In 
particular, Michael Chase, who has translated the bulk of Hadot’s works into 
English, has recently presented Philosophy as a Way of Life as a third way of 
doing philosophy that is distinct from both analytic and continental 
approaches.32 He offers an autobiographical account of his own first experiences 
with philosophy and describes his own undergraduate education in analytic 
philosophy. He was, he says, “introduced to reading some of the most boring 
material I have ever encountered,”33 which unsurprisingly left him feeling 
dissatisfied. For Chase, who was interested in the big questions that had 
occupied much of the history of philosophy, his analytic professors seemed bent 
on dispensing with such questions altogether, to the point of advocating “the 
elimination of philosophy itself.”34 No wonder that many of them seemed 
embarrassed to be philosophers at all and spent much of their professional lives 
wishing they were scientists.  
 
																																																								
32 See Michael Chase, “Observations on Pierre Hadot’s Conception of Philosophy as a Way of 
Life,” in Michael Chase, Stephen R. L. Clark, and Michael McGhee, eds, Philosophy as a Way of 
Life, Ancients and Moderns: Essays in Honor of Pierre Hadot (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2013), 
262-86.  
33 Ibid. 269.  
34 Ibid. 272.  
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Like many philosophy students before and since who have found themselves 
uninspired by possible worlds or out-of-control trolleys, Chase decided to move 
to a different university for his graduate studies where he would be able to study 
continental philosophy, which he had been told was “the only other game in 
town.”35 Although more congenial in many ways, Chase found continental 
philosophy’s own brand of jargon as off putting as the logical symbols he had 
just fled, especially in the secondary literature where “this jargon seemed to 
become an end in itself.”36 Summing up his experiences of both analytic and 
continental philosophy, Chase writes:  
 
I had had a taste of both Analytic and Continental philosophy, the 
two mutually exclusive branches of the discipline, and neither had 
satisfied me. Neither seemed able to speak to my thirst for the 
honest, jargon-free discussions of philosophical issues that 
genuinely mattered to my life.37  
 
What he wanted was a third way and, to cut the story short, he found that in the 
work of Pierre Hadot, which he encountered after shifting direction to study 
Greek and Latin in order to work on Plato and Aristotle. Summing up, Chase 
says:  
 
Hadot’s conception of Philosophy as a Way of Life, which does not 
fit neatly into the usual two-pronged division of philosophy into 
																																																								
35 Ibid. 273.  
36 Ibid. 274.  
37 Ibid. 275
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Analytic and Continental, may provide indications of a third way as 
an alternative to them both.38  
 
This is because i) it does not shun the traditional big philosophical questions; ii) 
it deals with issues relevant to people’s lives; iii) it does not model itself on the 
natural sciences; and iv) it avoids being ironic or relativistic.39 It is a way of 
thinking about philosophy today that is accessible to non-experts and connects 
with the wider history of philosophy stretching back to antiquity. It also, 
especially in the hands of Hadot, has a rigorous intellectual foundation in the 
philological study of Greek and Latin texts. As such, it is also quite different 
from most popular philosophical writing that aims to offer people guidance in 
their daily lives.  
 
Whether Chases’s images of analytic and continental philosophy are entirely fair 
is a question I shall put to one side. I do not doubt for a moment that both 
accounts accurately present his own experiences as a student. No doubt both 
traditions are far richer than the particular instances that Chase encountered at 
university. The important point in the present context is that Chase is proposing 
three distinct traditions of philosophy rather than just two. It is also worth 
noting that Chase’s account does not neatly map onto the twofold division that I 
outlined earlier, even though there are some connections. Rather than draw a 
contrast between scientific and humanistic metaphilosophy, Chase’s distinction 
is between two kinds of equally arid and irrelevant academic discourse (analytic 
																																																								
38 Ibid. 280.  
39 See ibid.  
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and continental) versus a venerable ancient tradition of life-changing wisdom 
(Philosophy as a Way of Life).  
 
V. Undercutting the Divisions  
 
In a recent essay entitled “The Complications of Philosophy” Tom Stern also 
notes the contrast between modern impersonal academic philosophy and the 
ancient image of philosophy as a therapeutic practice that teaches people how 
to live.40 However, he insists that this ought not to be an either/or choice. How 
can we be inspired by, say, Nietzsche (his example), if we have not yet worked 
out precisely what Nietzsche was saying? No doubt Chase would agree, who, like 
his mentor Hadot, has devoted much of his own academic career to careful and 
patient scholarly work on ancient philosophical texts.41  
 
Stern recounts some of his experiences trying to bring philosophy to a wider 
public, running philosophy sessions for a mental health charity. The context of 
the sessions is broadly therapeutic but Stern is all too conscious that, for them 
to be serious philosophy sessions, a concern with trying to find the truth must 
trump any simplistic attempt to make the participants feel better. If they 
become simply therapy, can they at the same time be philosophy? Philosophy 
attempts to uncover truths, and some of those truths might not be particularly 
consoling at all: what if it turned out that life is meaningless, nothing possesses 
any inherent value, and there are no good reasons to keep living?  
																																																								
40 See Tom Stern, “The Complications of Philosophy,” The Point 10 (2015), online at 
<https://thepointmag.com/2015/examined-life/complications-of-philosophy>.  
41 Among Chase’s many scholarly works, I note his annotated translation of Simplicius, On 
Aristotle Categories 1-4 (London: Duckworth, 2003).  
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At the same time Stern is all too conscious that the vast bulk of academic 
philosophical writing has very little impact in the real world. Most of it, if it is 
read at all, is read only by a handful of other academic philosophers. If it all 
disappeared overnight tomorrow, he comments, few people in the wider world 
would even notice. At the same time, however, there is a real public appetite for 
philosophy, and that appetite is satisfied by an industry of popular, therapeutic, 
self-help books that have little or no connection with academic philosophy, and 
which academic philosophers tend to dismiss out of hand as not proper 
philosophy at all. While Stern is sympathetic to the idea of bringing philosophy 
to a wider public in a way that might impact on their lives, he knows that in 
practice this can often become simply an exercise in trying to make people feel 
better in which “a messy argument about what’s true and what’s false can just 
get in the way.”42 Stern’s greatest concern with that kind of popular philosophy 
is not its lack of academic or intellectual rigour but the way it papers over the 
fact that the truth might not make people feel better at all: perhaps on closer 
inspection it will turn out that you are indeed a failure, with no discernable 
talents, whom nobody loves. Reflect philosophically about your own life and 
you too can come to know that these things are in fact true. It may turn out that 
philosophy is no consolation at all.  
 
Stern’s final conclusion in his reflections about philosophy and its practical 
relevance is that “wherever we find philosophy we find, on the one hand, the 
pursuit of truth and, on the other, some promise to make a difference or to 
																																																								
42 Stern, “The Complications of Philosophy.”  
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guide us towards a better or a more fulfilled life.”43 If ever someone champions 
one side, the other side never quite goes away. Perhaps the best option, then, “is 
to keep moving from one to the next, back and forth, dissatisfied with each.”44  
 
At first glance, this contrast between these two sides of philosophy sounds 
similar to the contrast I drew earlier between Socratic, humanistic philosophy, 
motivated by a desire to transform one’s life, versus Aristotelian, scientific 
philosophy, concerned with truth. Yet Stern’s point is different. His point is that 
this tension is not between two competing conceptions of philosophy but is 
internal to any plausible account of philosophy. All philosophers worthy of the 
name are engaged in this constant back and forth between what we might call 
the Socratic and Aristotelian poles of philosophy. As I suggested earlier, both 
Socrates and Aristotle were concerned with the pursuit of knowledge and 
following a philosophical life, with the difference between them simply coming 
down to which of these was the ultimate motivating impulse. For Stern, both 
aspects are intrinsic to philosophy itself and any activity that tries to champion 
one at the expense of the other runs the risk of no longer being philosophy at all.  
 
Stern’s account has a lot to recommend it. All really good philosophy worthy of 
the name takes seriously the central idea of Philosophy as a Way of Life, but 
never at the expense of the desire to understand the world as it is. This means 
that it cannot be merely a project aimed at making us feel good, because truths 
can sometimes be uncomfortable. This deals with one of the concerns 
philosophers might legitimately have about the idea of Philosophy as a Way of 
																																																								
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
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Life, namely that it reduces philosophy to a form of therapy, becoming simply 
something that is supposed to make us feel better. When the Greek concept of 
eudaimonia is translated as ‘happiness’ and then packaged for popular 
consumption, the danger is that philosophy gets reduced to being part of what 
has been called the ‘happiness industry.’ The real concern here is that the 
motivation becomes simply to make people feel better, potentially at the 
expense of everything else: it does not matter what people believe so long as it 
has the desired effect. That is certainly not what Socrates had in mind; his 
motivation to live a philosophical life, grounded on secure knowledge of what is 
and is not good, was, as we all know, one fraught with difficulties. And 
Aristotle’s ideas about eudaimonia, as anyone who has dipped into the 
Nicomachean Ethics knows, do not straightforwardly correspond to what people 
now think of as ‘happiness.’ In short, if we want to think of philosophy as 
something engaged, practical, and life changing, we need to be careful not to 
reduce it to something we do just to make us feel better. Thus, Philosophy as a 
Way of Life ought not to be conceived merely as a form of therapy. The same 
applies if we avoid talk of happiness and instead focus on self-formation or self-
cultivation. The danger with Michel Foucault’s account of “technologies of the 
self” for instance, as Martha Nussbaum pointed out some time ago, is that it 
might be taken to be a purely aesthetic process of self-transformation that loses 
sight of what is distinctive about philosophy, namely a commitment to the truth 
based on sound arguments.45  
 
In the light of what we have discussed so far, we might now point to three 
distinct views about Philosophy as a Way of Life. These are:  																																																								
45 See Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 5.  
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1. The claim that Philosophy as a Way of Life is a distinct tradition within 
Western philosophy, different in form and motivation from both 
analytic and continental philosophy, dominant in antiquity and present 
ever since, albeit marginalized in recent times.  
 
2. The claim that Philosophy as a Way of Life is a humanistic approach to 
philosophy, to be contrasted with a scientific approach and, as such, 
perhaps sharing more in common with the work of some continental 
philosophers than it does with most analytic philosophy.  
 
3. The claim that Philosophy as a Way of Life is one pole inherent to all 
philosophy, sometimes marginalized but always present to a greater or 
lesser extent.  
 
My own response to this would be to return to the question of motivation: does 
one do philosophy in order to transform one’s life, or in order to comprehend 
the world? I am sympathetic to Stern’s view that all really good philosophy does 
both. Do we have to choose? Perhaps we do not, but I think the notion of 
Philosophy as a Way of Life involves the claim that the ultimate motivation is 
the Socratic one to transform one’s life, with the caveat, as Stern points out, that 
for this to be philosophy at all that motivation cannot be at the expense of a 
commitment to the truth, for that is part of what makes it philosophy.46 There 
have been numerous thinkers throughout the history of philosophy who have 																																																								
46 It is worth noting that in the Apology, 29d-e, Socrates berates his fellow Athenians for focusing 
their attention on money and reputation rather than “truth (alêtheia) and understanding 
(phronêsis) and the perfection of soul.”  
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held this view, some of whom might now be labelled ‘continental’ philosophers, 
and perhaps some more recently who fall into the increasingly amorphous 
analytic tradition.47 In that sense, I would be inclined to say that Philosophy as a 
Way of Life cuts across that divide rather than standing as a distinct third 
tradition.48 
 
VI. Learning from Lucretius  
 
I would like to conclude by saying a little more about the relationship between 
what we might simplistically call ‘therapy’ and ‘truth’. To do this I want to look 
more closely at one particular philosopher, one who embraces both the 
practical, therapeutic role of philosophy and its commitment to the truth. The 
philosopher I have in mind is Lucretius.49  
 
Lucretius’s poem On the Nature of Things is divided into six books.50 Its form – a 
lengthy didactic poem about Nature – was probably inspired by the work of 
Empedocles while its contents follow closely Epicurus’s magnum opus On 
Nature, which was for a long time lost but fragments of which have been 
																																																								
47 On the amorphousness of analytic philosophy see Glock, What is Analytic Philosophy? and on 
theoretical and practical motivations see esp. 200-1.  
48 It is worth noting that Hadot not only had interests in a number of philosophers sometimes 
labelled ‘continental’, he also wrote on Wittgenstein and was one of his first champions in 
France. See now Pierre Hadot, Wittgenstein et les limites du langage (Paris: Vrin, 2014).   
49 Hadot was certainly familiar with the work of Lucretius, to which he refers throughout 
Philosophy as a Way of Life.  
50 There are numerous editions of Lucretius; I have tended to rely on Cyril Bailey, Titi Lucreti Cari 
De Rerum Natura Libri Sex, 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), from whom I take the Latin 
text. For translations I quote from Ronald Latham’s slightly more expansive version, On the 
Nature of the Universe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951), occasionally modified.  
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recovered from among the papyri found at Herculanuem.51 Each book opens 
with a reflection on the nature and purpose of philosophy, which function as 
repeated reminders as to the purpose of the work as a whole.  
 
At the opening of Book 1 Lucretius is explicit that the task at hand is to 
transform one’s life for the better and that the only way to do this is by gaining a 
correct understanding of Nature. The great enemy throughout the poem is 
superstition (religio) – a false and confused set of beliefs that cause people to 
behave badly. It is superstition above all else that must be overcome and there is 
only one way to do this. He writes:  
 
This dread and darkness of the mind cannot be dispelled by the 
sunbeams, the shining shafts of day, but only by an understanding 
of the outward form and inner workings of nature.52  
 
That these three lines are key to understanding Lucretius’s purpose is 
underscored by the fact that he repeats them verbatim in the openings of Books 
2, 3, and 6 as well.53 What is striking about them in their first instance in Book 1 
is that they immediately precede his account of the Parmenidean metaphysical 
foundations of atomism – the very next lines say “in tackling this theme, our 
starting-point will be this principle: nothing can ever be created by divine power 
																																																								
51 On its Empedoclean form and Epicurean content see David Sedley, Lucretius and the 
Transformation of Greek Wisdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
52 Lucretius, De rerum natura 1.146-8: Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest / non radii 
solis neque lucida tela diei / discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque.  
53 Thus De rerum natura 1.146-8 = 2.59-61 = 3.91-3 = 6.39-41.  
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out of nothing.”54 The section that follows is probably the most abstract and 
philosophically technical part of the entire work and so the part that may seem 
to be of least practical relevance to anything, let alone overcoming the “terror of 
the mind” (terrorem animi). Yet Lucretius reminds us at the outset that his plan 
for therapy of the soul requires abstract metaphysics and that these 
metaphysical reflections will have a transformative effect on our lives. 
Metaphysics is both a necessary and ultimately sufficient condition for self-
transformation.  
 
At the opening of Book 2 he insists that it is reason (ratio) that can cure us of the 
fears and anxieties that keep us awake at night.55 Only philosophy can save us. 
And again at the beginning of Book 3 he says that the terrors of the mind (animi 
terrores) will only take flight when reason (ratio) uncovers the true nature of 
things (naturam rerum).56 That Lucretius sees the task at hand as a therapeutic 
one is also underscored at the opening of Book 4 where he compares his own 
use of poetry to present natural philosophy with the doctor who sugar coats his 
medicine.57 The poetry is designed to lure readers in but Lucretius is explicit that 
the goal is twofold: to understand Nature and to grasp the benefits of doing so.58  
 
																																																								
54 De rerum natura 1.149-50: principium cuius hinc nobis exordia sumet, / nullam rem e nihilo gigni 
divinitus umquam. 
55 De rerum natura 2.53-4: quid dubitas quin omni’ sit haec rationi’ potestas? / omnis cum in 
tenebris praesertim vita laboret.  
56 De rerum natura 3.14-16: nam simul ac ratio tua coepit vociferari / naturam rerum, divina mente 
coorta, / diffugiunt animi terrores ... 
57 See De rerum natura 4.10-25. This section is a repetition of 1.926-50 with some minor 
variations.  
58 De rerum natura 4.24-5: ... dum percipis omnem / naturam rerum ac persentis utilitatem. 
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Philosophy is presented as the rule of life at the beginning of Book 5, as that 
which rescues a person’s life from chaos and darkness, and leads it to the 
Epicurean goal of tranquillity.59 In what must be the most audacious defence of 
the utility of philosophy ever written, Lucretius compares the usefulness of 
philosophy to other human creations, including farming, the invention of which 
must surely be the single most significant event in human history. Lucretius 
argues that philosophy is more important than farming because it is still possible 
to be happy without such an innovation but it is impossible to live well without 
philosophy. There are no happy and content noble savages according to 
Lucretius, and the unexamined life is indeed not worth living. A good life is 
impossible without a mind purged by reason, which only philosophy can 
deliver.60  
 
The final book of the poem opens with a eulogy to Epicurus.61 For Lucretius 
Epicureanism is a therapeutic philosophy and the reason why it works where 
others fail is precisely because it was Epicurus who uncovered the truth about 
the way the universe works. It was, Lucretius says, “with words of truth” that 
Epicurus “purged the heart.”62 He then repeats those three lines we saw earlier in 
Book 1, reminding us once more that it is only by understanding Nature that one 
can overcome the terrors of the mind.  
 
What comes through very clearly, then, is that there is no choice between 
conceiving philosophy as therapeutic, on the one hand, and its commitment to 																																																								
59 See De rerum natura 5.1-21.  
60 De rerum natura 5.18: at bene non poterat sine puro pectore vivi.  
61 See De rerum natura 6.1-42.  
62 De rerum natura 6.24: veridicis igitur purgavit pectora dictis.  
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truth, on the other. The only way to overcome our fears and anxieties, Lucretius 
insists, is by uncovering the truth about the way the world works. The Stoics 
took a similar line, and so did Spinoza, who in his Treatise on the Emendation of 
the Intellect argued that the only way for him to overcome the mental 
disurbances that stopped him attaining the happiness he desired was via a 
proper understanding of Nature.63 All these philosophers share an outlook quite 
different from the one outlined by Stern, in which facing reality can all too often 
breed despair. It is also worth noting that the Lucretian point regarding the 
relationship between therapy and truth goes in both directions, namely that the 
only philosophical therapy that will ever work is one grounded in truth and that 
the pursuit of truth, insofar as it frees us from confusion, error, and superstition, 
is itself therapeutic.  
 
Lucretius gives us a vivid example of what Philosophy as a Way of Life might 
look like in action. He explicitly sees his philosophy as a guide to life. The 
division I proposed earlier between scientific and humanistic conceptions of 
philosophy more or less collapses here, although, as we have seen, Lucretius is 
much closer to Socrates than Aristotle when it comes to his ultimate 
motivation. His motivation is indeed therapeutic, but a therapy based on, rather 
than at the expense of, the truth.  
 
 
 
 																																																								
63 Benedictus de Spinoza, Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione § 14 (Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl 
Gebhardt (Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1925), 2: 8; The Collected Works of Spinoza I, trans. Edwin 
Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 11).  
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VII. Conclusions  
 
Philosophy as a Way of Life is a model of philosophy that emphasizes its 
practical, life-changing aspects. It cuts across the division between analytic and 
continental philosophy, neither aligned with nor opposed to either tradition. It 
can be a useful way to think about philosophy if the wider philosophical culture 
tends to downplay its practical side. Yet, as we have seen, there is a good case for 
the claim that all philosophy worthy of the name acknowledges this aspect of 
philosophy, which has been there since the beginning. If the idea is to refer to 
anything distinctive, we might reserve it for those conceptions of philosophy 
that explicitly identify their motivation as the transformation of one’s way of 
life. This would certainly apply to Lucretius. But, as Lucretius himself has shown 
us, perhaps it does not matter so much whether we start out in the pursuit of 
truth or with a desire for a transformed life, for if we do our philosophy well we 
shall always end up with both.64  
 
																																																								
64 An earlier version of this paper was read at the Australasian Society for Continental 
Philosophy conference at Deakin University, Melbourne, in December 2016. I must thank both 
Matthew Sharpe and Sean Bowden for inviting me to speak at the conference and then to 
contribute to this issue of Parrhesia. A second version was read at a workshop at Monash 
University’s Prato Centre, Italy, ‘Reinventing Philosophy as a Way of Life’, held in July 2017 and 
organized by Michael Ure, to whom further thanks. I would also like to thank the audiences in 
both Melbourne and Prato for their comments on the paper, and an anonymous reviewer for 
Parrhesia for some helpful corrections and comments.  
